Bill Kling Memories

Some time ago I received a note from Bill Kling, who spent a lot of time in Taiwan during the 1970s.  He described his experiences in some detail and I'm pleased to post some of those comments here today.  Any errors or omissions are mine.

I first heard of Taipei when I was in Vietnam.  In March of 1971, I asked for Sydney, Australia, for my R and R (Rest and Recuperation) leave.  However, my orders came back for a week in Taipei, Taiwan, instead.  I was not happy, but since it was time away from Vietnam and my buddy got the same orders, I decided to go.  While on R and R I met some other GIs and they convinced me that I should try to get assigned to Grass Mountain Tech Control.

During that R and R I remember frequenting the Sea Dragon and 63 Clubs run by MAAG and really enjoyed myself.  I played golf at Tamsui, visited Green Lake, Wulai and generally left the island happy that the Army redirected my R&R to Taipei.

After my Vietnam tour I returned to the States.  Then one day I was told I would be on orders soon and it was suggested that I fill out a “dream sheet’ to improve my chances of a good assignment.  Of course I asked for Taiwan, Hawaii or Thailand,  and of course everyone laughed at me and said, “No one ever reads those things.”  In about a month I got orders for Taiwan -- very lucky for a young, married E-5 to get an accompanied, overseas assignment.

After receiving letters from my sponsor, I packed and shipped my furniture and away we flew to Seattle-Tacoma (Sea-Tac) airport to take a military charter flight to Sung Shan Air Base.  I got lucky at Sea-Tac as I met the Command Sergeant Major from MAAG who was returning from leave.  He was in charge of the 63 Club.  I do not remember his name now, but we ended up becoming good friends.  He helped me get into Bank of Taiwan housing in sixty days when the waiting list was normally nine months.  He  showed me how to manage my moving while living in a guest house upon arrival on the island.  My sponsor put me in the Formosa Guest House at what we thought was a good rate, however I was moved to the Taiwan Guest House, a bigger place and one third cheaper.

My next challenge was to buy a car, but I didn’t have much money.  I had to decide between a very small new car called a Daihatsu, or buy a used one from someone who was leaving Taiwan.  Two friends and I decided to buy the new one.  After two months on the island, I had a Chinese identification card, Chinese drivers license, ration cards for liquor and the PX and had been assigned a shift at Grass Mountain Tech Control.

I began taking college courses from the University of Maryland in September 1973 and took two courses per semester during my remaining time on Taiwan.  I'm not sure how I had time for all of this but I also joined a bowling team and played for the Grass Mountain “Outlaws” softball team.

During 1974 and until August 1975 in addition to my work, schooling, and sports some of the many highlights included being part of a Dragon Dance team, Chinese Dragon boat team, seeing a “Double Ten" nighttime celebration and a very large July 4^th fireworks display at Taipei American school.  I took trips to Seoul, Korea, Clark Air Base in the Philippines, and I also volunteered to go to Vietnam to assist in communications support during the last days of our involvement there during March/April 1975.

But it was time to leave and I was extended for operational needs two months beyond the normal tour.  Our last several months consisted of learning what a “chop man” was, buying teakwood furniture, buying carpets, handicrafts, and saying good bye to the many American and Chinese friends we made during that time. I am still in contact with the family that ran the first guest house we stayed in when we arrived on the island.

So during by Taipei tour I got promoted to E-6, accumulated two years of college credits, a house full of furniture, put some money in the bank, and made new friends.  But now I was leaving for Ft. Huachuca, Arizona wondering what this assignment would bring.

After a year or so back in the States, I went to the USACC personnel department to see if I could get reassigned.  Again, I was very fortunate as the personnel sergeant was my former supervisor from Vietnam.  I asked him to find me an assignment where I could use my skills, of course asking for only the most popular locations and he said he would see what he could do.  Well, to my surprise, about a month later I called in to my company First Sergeant who wanted to know what friends I had in high places.  He then told me that I had been assigned back to USACC Taiwan.  With the troop level being reduced  to only a few hundred personnel how lucky was this for me?

In January 1977 I was headed back to the island I knew so well.  I could tell as soon as I arrived that things had changed.  Instead of over 7,000  U. S. military on Taiwan there were now less than 1,500.  There was no waiting list for Bank of Taiwan Housing, plenty of appliances to buy in the PX, the China Seas Club was never crowded, and the education center had reduced the number of classes they offered.  When I arrived at the Grass Mountain facility I was now a trick chief, but instead of 6 or 7 on a shift there was only 3.  While being very glad to be back, there was a sad feeling that only grew during my tour.

The good times with good friends were still there but the small things gradually changed the atmosphere.  Some of the changes were the morning briefing to the Commander of USACC was now done by voice order wire, not in person; the detachment at Grass Mountain moved downtown to the HSA compound; the Autovon switch was deactivated and shipped to Okinawa; the hours of the snack bar and PX were reduced; the Tien Mou swimming pool was empty;  I could go on and on.

By June of 1977 we were training local nationals to do the job previously performed by USACC.  This was difficult as I trained locals in Vietnam before we there in 1972.  I couldn’t help making the comparison.  I still think of Mr. Chen, Mr. Wu, and Mike Chiang often.  Many of my Chinese friends were now asking, When are ALL of you leaving,?  I just laughed it off saying that we will always be here, but the United States is reducing forces across Asia.

The tour continued as we accomplished our mission with fewer personnel.  We had a typhoon and an earthquake in 1977.  That, combined with a major submarine cable cut to Okinawa, made for a very fast year.

By the time 1978 rolled around our local national friends were doing the bulk of our work.  The Defense Communications Agency reduced our reporting requirements from every 8 hours to every 24 hours.  We really felt the end was near, as the amount of our normal work was greatly reduced.  We now disconnected equipment and packed it up to be shipped off the island.  It was now an effort to get enough guys to complete our softball teams, Shu Linkou Air Station was closed, Taipei Air Station was in caretaker status, and by July 1978 USACC was down to approximately 150 personnel.  Still, life went on.  I still went to the Tien Mou Mongolian Barbecue regularly, got video tapes to watch on my Sony Betamax, and of course I continued on with school.

In January 1979, we were living in the guest house and were concerned about riots and protests.  A friend had his car burned at the China Seas Club, another friend was attacked, but fortunately he just got a few bumps and bruises.  We were very cautious, but in a few days things calmed down.  Most of us now shared rides to work, or took a military shuttle.  I thought after all these years that the good duty stations were all going away.  Thailand, Taiwan, Philippines, Iran, and Ethiopia all closed for Tech Control personnel.  I was feted to a going away party by a few close military and Chinese friends. So, finally  my family and I left via the new CKS airport on January 28, 1979 and a few close Taiwanese families came to see us off.

Some time after I arrived at Ft. Huachuca (Arizona), I was told to report to a colonel who had a project for me:  I was to help coordinate the final departure of men and equipment from Taiwan.  It was an exciting and easy job.  I helped whenever there was information concerning disposition of equipment, assisted other solders if they had problems with assignments, household goods, etc.  I think we left Taiwan around April 28, 1979 and I left the Army on May 10, 1979.

Somehow Taiwan and I were destined to be linked.  It is truly amazing to me to realize that from 1971-79 Taiwan played such a major role in my life. To this day I still have USACC and Chinese friends from 30 years ago.   I have been back to the island three times since then, always on business, with the last trip in 2003.

Key Personnel - 1975

Glenn in Taipei recently sent me some listings of United States key personnel working in Taipei, including those at USTDC and MAAG.   These were published by The China News, which was Taiwan's first English paper (1949 or 1950), and which was followed by the China Post.

This is a portion of the listing for 1975 that names key personnel at USTDC, MAAG, NAMRU-2 and a few others.  Click on the images to magnify them.

The Main Gate

During 2008, United Tian Mu monthly magazine published a story about Charlie Hoppe, who was a 22 year old Intelligence Officer when he arrived at USTDC in 1956.  He and his wife returned to Taipei in 2008 for a visit and he brought the photo shown below with him.  Charlie took the photo in 1957 and it shows the gate at the entrance of TDC as it appeared at that time.  Below that is a photo of the gate as it appeared during my tour in 1973-74.  Just to the left of these gates was Hsinsheng North Road.

Many thanks to Ken A. (Linkou vet) and Les D. for providing these images.

CCK Film Clip

My friend Klaus pointed me to this short YouTube video (narrated in German) of some American pilots and aircraft at Ching Chuan Kang Air Base in 1976.



I believe that the F-4 fighter aircraft were probably detached from Kadena Air Base on Okinawa.

MAAG -- The Big Picture

A big salute goes to LTC Scott Ellinger for locating this film from the 1950s television series, "The Big Picture."  It runs about 28 minutes and describes the early efforts of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in training the Nationalist forces on Taiwan.  If you are unable to view it, click HERE to visit the website.

Walking Tours of Taipei

A couple of months ago I mention that Kent Mathieu (Taipei Air Station blog and website) has been posting videos to YouTube of his walks around Taipei.  He has now done several of these videos, pointing out where things are (or used to be) located.  The most recent video (30 Sep 2010) is a walk along Sung Shan North road in the vicinity of the hostels and HSA compounds.

You can find his videos HERE, and I've also added an item under "Taiwan Links of Interest" in the right-hand column of this blog.  Look for "Kent Mathieu's walking tours of present-day Taipei."

Current Yangmingshan Housing Photos

Scott has posted several great photos of the former Yangmingshan American military C-Area housing units.  Click HERE to view the images.

Where Was This Sign?

Old friend Marc told me about this photo that may have been taken sometime during the 1950s.

I don't remember this sign at all when I was there in 1973-74 and I'm wondering where it was located and what direction it was facing.  I assume it was in or near the east or west compound.  The arrows on the sign provide some clues, showing that the Club 63 and the hospital are to the left, with Finance and the commissary to the right.  But the sign on the building to the left of the sign appears to read "Hospital," suggesting this was before the Naval Hospital was built in Tien Mou.  Someone once commented here that the hospital was originally in one of the compounds until the new one was built.  Was the Club 63 ever located somewhere near the compound area instead of just across the river and to the right of the Grand Hotel?

History of U.S. Military Assistance to Taiwan -- 1950-1959, Part 3

Today I'm wrapping up the history of U.S. military assistance to Taiwan during the period 1950-1959.  As I mentioned earlier, the source for this information was a Joint Chiefs of Staff report from 1961.  It filled in a lot of gaps in the information I had and I hope that it does the same for readers of this blog as well.

One thing I neglected to mention yesterday is that while Vice Admiral Ingersoll was Commander of the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, he was also Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, according to Naval records.  That seems odd to me and I could find no explanation for it.

On 5 September 1958, as Communist pressure against the offshore islands continued to mount, CINCPAC informed the JCS that he must have a single commander in the Taiwan area who was directly responsible to him.  CINCPAC then noted the proposed command relationships set forth in his plan to counter Chinese aggression in the vicinity of Taiwan without American use of nuclear weapons.  Under this arrangement, the Commander, Taiwan Defense Command, would exercise operational control over the forces allocated for the execution of his assigned task.  He was to exercise this control through the chief of the advisory group, the Commander, Taiwan Patrol Force, and the Commander, 13th Air Task Force (Provisional).  The commander of the defense command also would coordinate the activities of American forces assigned to support his efforts.  Finally, he was to coordinate the actions of American and Chinese Nationalist forces.  (CINCPAC msg to JCS, 050330Z Sep 58 (CCS 381 Formosa, 11-8-48, Section 38A)

Three days later, in a message to the Chief of Naval Operations, CINCPAC elaborated upon his system of command relationships.  The Air Force subordinate commander, he pointed out, would be assigned the responsibilities of Air Defense Commander.  Should the JCS prefer to establish a joint task force to deal with the current emergency, CINCPAC would be equally satisfied.  If such a task force were created, however, he would propose the Commander, Taiwan Defense Command, as its commander, with the Commander, Taiwan Patrol Force, as Navy task group commander, the Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, as Army task group commander, and the Commander 13th Air Task Force as Air Force task group and air defense commander.  Whatever the arrangement, the chief of the advisory group would remain responsible for the functions of that organization (CINCPAC msg to CNO, 082010Z Sep 58 (CCS 381 Formosa, 11-8-48, Section 38A).

At their meeting on 9 September 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in the CINCPAC recommendation that the Commander, Taiwan Defense Command, become the commander of a unified subordinate command comprising all force assigned for the accomplishment of his mission.  The JCS message sent on the following day designated the Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, as subordinate Army commander, the Commander, Taiwan Patrol Force, as subordinate Navy commander, and the Commander, 13th Air Task Force, as subordinate Air Force commander with responsibility as air defense commander.  Advisory group personnel were excluded from the Army forces under the operational control of the Taiwan Defense Command (JCS 2118/114, Note by the Secretaries to the JCS on the Establishment of U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, with enclosure, dtd 10 Sep 58; JCS msg to ComNavPhil, JCS 947808, dtd 10 Sep 58 (CCS 381 Formosa, 11-8-48, Section 39).

While the American forces, except for the advisory group, were being brought under the operational control of the Taiwan Defense Command, the separation of the Military Assistance Advisory Group and the defense command staffs continued.  On 24 September, the Commander, Taiwan Defense Command/Military Assistance Advisory Group directed the continuation on an interim basis of the organizational plan used during the recent emergency (ComUSTDC/MAAG Coordinating Authority Instruction 5400.4, dtd 24 Sep 58, Appendix 5 to Enclosure A to JCS 1259/436).   CINCPAC, however, continued to urge completion of the consolidation begun in March 1958 (Enclosure A to JCS 1259/436).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, unable to agree on the completion of the merger, on 8 May 1959 forwarded their views to the Secretary of Defense.  The Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, objected to the consolidation because the two commands involved had radically different duties.  Although they agreed that an operational command which excluded advisory personnel had been necessary during the 1958 crisis, they recommended that the Taiwan Defense Command be replaced by a planning and liaison group as soon as the existing tensions had eased.  The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps recommended the approval of the CINCPAC plan of consolidation, provided that, when the advisory group's duties were divided along functional staff lines, the separate service sections be retained as major subordinate staff components.  Those who favored the proposal believed that its acceptance would simplify the military structure on Taiwan and of the Pacific unified command, establish a single headquarters to deal with the Chinese, simplify command lines and insure unity of effort, and reduce facilities as well as the number of Americans needed on Taiwan (JCSM 175-59 to SecDef, with appendices, dtd 8 May 59 (JMF 5166, 9 Jan 59).

The Secretary of Defense, after studying the divergent views and holding additional discussions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, informed the Chairman on 15 June that consolidation did not appear desirable.  On 8 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCPAC that the Taiwan Defense Command and the Military Assistance Advisory Group were to remain separate but that this decision did not affect CINCPAC's authority to select a senior officer at Taiwan as his representative (JCS 1259/477, Note by the Secretaries to the JCS on Consolidation of Command Structure on Taiwan, with enclosure, dtd 26 Jun 59; Decision on JCS 1259/477, dtd 8 Jul 59 JCS msg to CINCPAC,JCS 962043, dtd 8 Jul 59 (JMF 5166 9 Jan 59).

The decision to abandon the uncompleted program of consolidation had, in the opinion of CINCPAC, no effect on the existing Military Assistance Advisory Group agreement with the Nationalist Government.  The principal change was the separation of military assistance activities from the Taiwan Defense Command, a planning and operational headquarters.  The status of the defense command also was unchanged, save that its commander would have no additional responsibility toward the advisory group CINCPAC msg to AsstSecDef (Public Affairs), 010154Z Aug 59 (JMF 5166, 9 Jan 59).

Summary

The Military Assistance Advisory Group, Taiwan, encountered some opposition from Nationalist authority.  The reorganization of the Chinese logistical effort, the decreasing of the authority of political commissars, and the attempt to convince higher echelons not to interfere in the conduct of their subordinates were elements of the American program that held little appeal for the Generalissimo.  The advisors, however, did succeed in vastly increasing the Nationalist combat capability (Historical Division, JCS, History of the Formosa Situation, dtd 15 Sep 55, Series B, pp. 321-326).

Because of the need to coordinate Chinese and American efforts in defense of the island, the advisory group formed a liaison center, which was expanded by CINCPAC into the Taiwan Defense Command.  The defense command provided CINCPAC with direct access to the Chinese high command and enabled him to keep abreast of Nationalist plans.  Since it dealt primarily with planning for the Sino-American defense of Taiwan, attempts to enlarge the scope of the defense command to include the advisory group's duties of providing military assistance met with no success.  The crisis of September 1958 emphasized the essential differences between the Taiwan Defense Command and the Military Advisory Group, and in the following year the Secretary of Defense decided that the two organization should not be consolidated.

History of U.S. Military Assistance to Taiwan -- 1950-1959, Part 2

Today I'm continuing with the history of the U.S. Military Advisory Group (MAAG) and the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (USTDC) as described in the Joint Chiefs of Staff report "Selected Aspects of U.S. Military Assistance" dated 13 December 1961. This section deals directly with the creation of USTDC.

United States Taiwan Defense Command

RADM Frank Fenno

As early as October 1952, the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Taiwan, had established a Formosa Liaison Center which was responsible for the coordination and liaison needed to plan, prepare for, and execute any possible operations, including combined training, that might involve the use of Sino-American forces in defense of the island.  The Liaison Center was subordinate to MAAG, Taiwan, until April 1955, when CINCPAC (who had acquired responsibility for the defense of Formosa) directed the commander of the newly created Formosa Defense Command (U.S.) to take over responsibility for the Formosa Liaison Center.  The latter designation was retained as a cover title for the defense command until 1 November 1955 when it was abandoned in favor of the more appropriate designation, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command.  By the end of 1955, CINCPAC had converted the former Liaison Center of the advisory group in a joint headquarters that had direct access to the highest military and administrative councils of the Nationalist government. (Appendix 2 to Enclosure A to JCS 1259/436, Note by the Secretaries to the JCS on Command Structure on Taiwan, dtd 9 Jan 59; CINCPAC msg to Com TDC 232248Z Apr 55 (381 Formosa, 11-8-48, Section 23))

VADM Stuart Ingersoll

[NOTE:  As I mentioned a few days ago in my Formosa Liaison Center piece,  RADM Frank Fenno was Commander of the Formosa Liaison Center in 1955 until it was renamed USTDC and VADM Ingersoll assumed command of the organization.  VADM Ingersoll was Commander from 1955 until 1957.]

The Consolidation of the Military Assistance Advisory Group with the Taiwan Defense Command

By the end of 1957, in keeping with the current views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, CINCPAC began planning the eventual merger of all American commands on Taiwan into a single headquarters under the Taiwan Defense Command.  As the Nationalists became better able to defend the island, the advisory group, it was believed, would gradually shift from offering guidance on the technical and tactical levels to providing advice at higher echelons and instruction in managerial techniques.  CINCPAC became convinced that a consolidated joint staff would be better able to provide the Chinese the assistance that they would need. (Enclosure A to JCS 1259/436)

The first CINCPAC directives concerning the consolidation were issued in March 1958.  These directives, based upon decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, marked the beginning of a two-phase program.  Effective that month, CINCPAC redesignated the Commander, Taiwan Defense Command, as Commander, Taiwan Defense Command/Military Assistance Advisory Group.  The Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, who retained his old title, was also to serve as Deputy Commander, Taiwan Defense Command, while the former deputy commander assumed a new role as deputy commander and chief of the consolidated joint staff.  Since the senior Army officer had just reached Taiwan and the new senior naval officer was about to depart, CINCPAC did not anticipate a further merging of the command until February 1959 (Enclosure A to JCS 1259/436).

During the first few months following its consolidation, the combined Taiwan Defense Command/Military Assistance Advisory Group found itself in something of an anomalous  position, for the only American military organization officially recognized by the Nationalist Government was the advisory group, which was now a subordinate element of the defense command and not the echelon for dealing with the higher authorities of the Nationalist Government.  This problem seemed capable of solution, however.  In January 1959, CINCPAC reported to the JCS that "an interim agreement recognizing non-MAAG units on Taiwan and giving them status parallel to that of the MAAG is in the mill and should be signed shortly." (CINCPAC msg to JCS, 102243Z Jan 59 (JMF5166, 9 Jan 59, Group No. 1))

The program of consolidation was temporarily suspended after the Chinese Communists, in August 1958, began an intensive bombardment of the Nationalist-held offshore islands.  Because of the immediate threat, the separate defense command and advisory group staffs were re-established, so that both could operate at top speed.  The combined title, however, was retained.  (Enclosure A to JCS 1259/436)

(To be concluded tomorrow)